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LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
RETARDED: PENNHURST STATE
SCHOOL & HOSPITAL V
HALDERMAN
N 1974 Terri Lee Halderman, a mentally retarded resident of
Pennhurst State School and Hospital,' initiated a class action suit on
behalf of all Pennhurst residents 2 to challenge conditions at the institu-
tion.3 After a lengthy and comprehensive court proceeding, 4 a federal dis-
trict court concluded that Pennhurst was "inappropriate and inadequate
for the habilitation of the retarded."' 5 The court found that conditions at
the institution6 violated the fourteenth amendment due process right to
minimally adequate habilitation in the least restrictive environment, 7 the
eighth amendment right to be free from harm,8 and the fourteenth amend-
1. Located in Spring City, Pennsylvania, Pennhurst provides long-term, institutional-
ized care for 1,230 mentally retarded citizens. Pennhurst is self-contained; the residents are
confined within the grounds and do not participate in any aspect of community life outside
the institution. Brief for the United States at 6-7, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Haider-
man, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981).
2. The court certified the class as all those persons who were Pennhurst residents at the
time the suit was initiated and those persons who might become residents in the future. In
addition to Terri Lee Halderman, the named plaintiffs later included seven other mentally
retarded citizens and the Parents and Family Association of Pennhurst, an advocacy organi-
zation formed by parents of Pennhurst residents. The United States and the Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Citizens subsequently were granted leave to intervene as plaintiffs.
Defendants to the action were Pennhurst State School and Hospital, the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Public Welfare, various state and county officials, and the superintendent and
several employees of Pennhurst. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1300-02 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
3. Id. at 1298.
4. For the original plaintiff's attorneys' description of events prior to and at trial, see
Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of/the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 717 (1979).
5. 446 F. Supp. at 1304.
6. The court described Pennhurst as impersonal, overcrowded, and understaffed. Id.
at 1303. The court further concluded that neglect and abuse created a dangerous environ-
ment, that unsanitary conditions were common, and that improper care and service delivery
deficiencies resulted in the deterioration of the residents' physical, mental, and emotional
conditions. Id. at 1303-10.
7. Id. at 1319. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § I.
8. 446 F. Supp. at 1320. The eighth amendment proscribes the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment was incorpo-
rated against the states through the fourteenth amendment in Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962). The Pennhurst court found Pennhurst residents, institutionalized under the
care of the state, were entitled to be free from mistreatment and harm; anything less would
be cruel and unusual punishments. 446 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
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ment equal protection right to nondiscriminatory habilitation.9 The dis-
trict court further found that existing conditions violated the residents'
statutory right to minimally adequate habilitation under federal law' 0 and
Pennsylvania state law. I The court ordered the eventual closing of Pen-
nhurst and the placement of all Pennhurst residents in community living
settings. 12
On appeal the Third Circuit avoided the constitutional issues and af-
firmed the lower court's decision solely on federal and state statutory
grounds. 13 Finding that the mentally retarded have a right to appropriate
treatment 14 in the least restrictive environment under the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,' 5 the court acknowl-
edged a private cause of action.' 6 The Third Circuit modified the district
court's grant of relief to include the possibility of placement at an im-
proved and adequate Pennhurst.17 The appellate court, however, did not
interpret federal or state law as mandating the closing of institutions such
as Pennhurst that house the mentally retarded. According to the court, the
9. 446 F. Supp. at 1320. The equal protection clause provides that no state shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Through segregation in an institution that did not adequately provide habilita-
tion, Pennhurst residents were held to have been denied education and training equal to that
received by other citizens. 446 F. Supp. at 1321.
10. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
11. Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
12. 446 F. Supp. at 1325. The court found that inherently restrictive institutions, such
as Pennhurst, impeded the process of normalization, a necessary component of constitution-
ally and statutonly mandated minimally adequate habilitation. The court, therefore, con-
cluded that it had no choice but to close Pennhurst. Id
The district court also mandated the creation of suitable community living arrangements
for all plaintiff class members, the development of individual habilitation plans for each
Pennhurst resident, the improvement of conditions at Pennhurst while the residents awaited
alternative placement, and the appointment of a special master to supervise implementation
of the court's order. Id. at 1326-29. The court found, however, no basis for awarding the
money damages sought by plaintiffs. Id at 1324.
13. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). The
court considered the preferred order of determining legal bases for relief to be federal statu-
tory grounds, state statutory grounds, and then constitutional grounds. Id at 94; see Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974); Silver v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
14. The court used the terms treatment and habilitation interchangeably. 612 F.2d at 95
n.14.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the DD
Act]. The DD Act was not raised in the pleadings presented by the parties to the district
court or in the original briefs filed on appeal. The Third Circuit requested supplemental
briefing on the DD Act. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531,
1535 n.3, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694, 702 n.3 (1981). The court, however, declined to rule on the
district court's interpretation and application of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), because "one clear federal statute" expressing the
governing rule "is enough." 612 F.2d at 108.
16. The court ruled that the DD Act met the criteria for implying a private cause of
action as set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975): the retarded are special beneficiaries
of the DD Act, judicial enforcement of the DD Act complies with congressional intent, a
private right of action would facilitate the the realization of the goals of the DD Act, and no
infringement of state authority and function would occur. 612 F.2d at 97-98.
17. Id at 115.
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DD Act allowed individual determinations of the most appropriate means
of providing habilitation and established a clear preference for deinstitu-
tionalization or placement in community living arrangements.' 8 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and re-
manded: The mentally retarded do not have a substantive right to habili-
tation in the least restrictive environment under section 6010 of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975.
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981).
I. LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
A. Constitutional Right to Habilitation in the Least
Restrictive Environment
While the past decade has witnessed a heightened awareness and recog-
nition' 9 of the rights of the mentally retarded,20 the Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue of the mentally retarded citizen's right to habili-
tation.21 The lower federal courts first recognized a constitutional right to
18. Id at 107.
19. Traditionally, the responsibility of providing care and services for the handicapped
has been delegated to the states. Judge Frank M. Johnson, author of the Wyatt decision,
observed that the federal courts historically have refrained from interfering in any area of
public service assigned to the states. When the states, however, systematically deny the con-
stitutional rights of citizens through the means chosen to deliver these services, the courts are
compelled to intervene. Judge Johnson asserts that this has been the impetus for recent
judicial recognition of the rights of the mentally retarded. Johnson, The Constitution and the
Federal District Judge, 54 TExAs L. REV. 903, 903-10 (1976); cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 117 (3d Cir. 1979) (Seitz, J., dissenting) (while federal
courts must intervene to end blatant disregard of constitutional rights of citizens evident in
deplorable institutional conditions, judiciary cannot overextend its authority and dictate to
state types of treatment and facilities that must be provided).
20. The American Association on Mental Deficiency has defined mental retardation as
"subaverage general intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental pe-
riod and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior." H. ROBINSON & N. RoBIN-
SON, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD 33-34 (1965).
Mental retardation and mental illness must be distinguished. Mental illness is defined as
an inability to cope with one's environment. Intelligence is not a factor. While mental retar-
dation occurs during the early developmental years, mental illness can manifest itself at any
stage of life. Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatmentfor Mentally Retarded Citizens.-
An Evolving Legal and Scientqe Inteface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 147 n.72 (1976). The
Supreme Court has indicated that the courts should observe this distinction; however, the
Court has not discussed the difference in legal treatment between the two populations.
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977). See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (1977).
21. A ruling, however, on the constitutional right of an involuntarily committed, men-
tally retarded patient to receive acceptable medical treatment may be forthcoming. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's finding that such a right
does exist. Youngberg v. Romeo, 101 S. Ct. 2313, 68 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1981). For the defini-
tions of habilitation and treatment, see note 22 infra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court also has not resolved the issue of the mentally ill citizen's right to
treatment. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Court, avoiding the right to
treatment question, held that the involuntary commitment of a nondangerous, self-sufficient
individual is a deprivation of the constitutional right to liberty. Id at 576. Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in O'Connor, however, warned that requiring the states to provide
treatment for the mentally ill would be a limitation on state power that has no historical
1981] NO TES
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habilitation 22 for the mentally retarded in Wyatt v. Stickney.23 In Wyatt
mentally retarded residents of Alabama's Partlow State School and Hospi-
tal argued that hazardous and substandard conditions at the institution24
constituted a violation of their constitutional right to adequate habilita-
tion.25 Acknowledging that civil commitment is a massive curtailment of
liberty, the district court ruled that the state must justify institutionaliza-
tion as effectuating some permissible purpose. 26 Characterizing this pur-
pose as the realization of the state's role of guardian of the disabled, the
court reasoned that the Constitution requires habilitation; institutionaliza-
tion was not to become a synonym for indefinite, unjustified imprison-
ment.27 Thus, the court in Wyatt based its decision on a due process
requirement of habilitation in return for civil commitment and held that
the involuntarily committed mentally retarded "have a constitutional right
to receive such individual habilitation as will give each of them a realistic
opportunity to lead a more useful and meaningful life and to return to
society."'28 In an effort to upgrade substandard conditions that denied the
residents their constitutional right, the Wyatt court further ordered the im-
plementation of forty-nine detailed minimum standards for adequate
habilitation.29
basis; thus, this creation of a new substantive constitutional right is discouraged. Id at 582-
83. In spite of its limitations, the O'Connor decision may be of particular significance to the
mentally retarded. Recognizing that many mildly and moderately retarded individuals are
certainly not dangerous and can be self-sufficient, the O'Connor right to liberty holding
becomes inconsistent with the concept of continual confinement in an institution. Mason &
Menolascino, supra note 20, at 156; see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (nature and
duration of commitment must be reasonably related to the reason for commitment).
22. Habilitation, which is most appropriate to the needs of the retarded, refers to educa-
tion and training, while medical treatment and cure are most appropriate to the needs of the
mentally ill. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314 n.49
(E.D. Pa. 1977). But see note 14 supra. For a more complete discussion of the meaning of
habilitation, see Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded" Some Critical Issues, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 153-54 (1971).
23. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part, remanded in part, and reserved in
part sub nom Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305(5th Cir. 1974). The decision followed from
a prior recognition of a constitutional right to treatment in favor of the mentally ill by the
same court. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp, 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
24. 344 F. Supp. at 391.
25. Id at 389.
26. Id at 390.
27. Id, commented on in Mason & Menolascino, supra note 20, at 151-52.
28. 344 F. Supp. at 390. The legal foundation for the right is the fourteenth amend-
ment. See note 7 supra.
29. 344 F. Supp. at 395-407. The decision and its mandated standards have been
viewed as an implied acceptance of the scientifically and educationally accepted develop-
mental model. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 20, at 149. The developmental model
stresses the potential of any mentally retarded individual to learn and grow progressively,
beginning from his current level of development, through interaction with other people and
the environment. Id at 137 n.33. Implementation of the developmental model is most suc-
cessful when combined with the principle of normalization as an overall approach. Normal-
ization refers to the treatment of the mentally retarded as normal people rather than as
deviants. Inherent in that treatment is the idea that mentally retarded individuals should be
exposed to everyday life to facilitate the development of behaviors that adhere to the societal
norm. Roos, The Law and Mentally Retarded People.- An Uncertain Future, 31 STAN. L.
Rnv. 613, 613-14 (1979).
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On appea 30 the Fifth Circuit rejected the Wyatt defendants' argument
that the state may institutionalize the mentally retarded because of their
inability to care for themselves.31 The court reasoned that even if the need
for care justified commitment, the Partlow residents' right to appropriate
care had been denied. 32 Furthermore, the court concluded that the need
for care justification emphasized state prerogatives that could not outweigh
the residents' personal interests in the preservation of their own liberty.33
Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's recognition of the consti-
tutional right to habilitation for involuntarily committed mentally retarded
citizens.34
Similarly, other federal courts have recognized the institutionalized
mentally retarded citizen's right to habilitation.35 While the Wyatt deci-
sion was limited to those involuntarily committed, 36 there has since been
judicial recognition that voluntary commitment37 of the mentally retarded
is an illusory concept. Limited intellectual abilities and the absence of al-
ternative living arrangements foreclose the possibility of the individual's
making a well-reasoned decision concerning his own commitment. 38
Moreover, the initiation of civil commitment proceedings can prevent a
voluntarily committed individual from exercising his right to leave an in-
stitution.39 For these reasons some decisions have eliminated the volun-
tary versus involuntary distinction, ordering habilitation under both forms
of commitment. 40 Nevertheless, the right to habilitation is not without
30. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (1974).
31. Id at 1313.
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id at 1313-14.
35. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976), afl'd, 601 F.2d
240 (5th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch v. Likins,
373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aflJd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1977). But see, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefel-
ler, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. Involuntary commitment refers to institutionalization through civil commitment
procedures initiated by the state. Murdock, supra note 22, at 154. The state action is consid-
ered justified because society has an interest m protecting retarded citizens who are unable
to make decisions as to their own needs. Schoenfeld, A Survey of the Constitutional Rights of
the Mentaly Retarded, 32 Sw. L.J. 605, 619 (1978).
37. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). Voluntary commitment reserves to the individual the right to leave the
institution at any time he chooses. Most institutionalized mentally retarded individuals are
admitted when they are children on the consent of their parents; thus, their commitment can
be termed voluntary. Murdock, supra note 22, at 154-55.
38. Murdock, supra note 22, at 156-61.
39. Id at 154.
40. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). The court originally based its decision on a constitutional right to protec-
tion from harm and rejected the constitutional right to habilitation argument. New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). In
its subsequent approval of a consent decree, however, the court reasoned that the right to
habilitation probably was not distinct from the right to protection from harm. 393 F. Supp.
at 718-19. In any case the relief granted would be the same. Id.; Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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limitation,41 and the precedential value of lower court decisions remains
uncertain in the absence of a Supreme Court ruling on the mentally re-
tarded citizen's constitutional right to habilitation.
The requirement that habilitation be provided in the environment that is
least restrictive of personal liberty is an extension of the constitutional
right to habilitation.42 This right to habilitation in the least restrictive en-
vironment stems from the principle of "less drastic means."' 43 The princi-
ple operates to restrict the pursuit of legitimate governmental purpose "by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved."' The Fifth Circuit's affirmation of Wyatt4 5
linked the principle of "less drastic means" with the already accepted sci-
entific and educational developmental model,46 thus providing a rationale
for the lower court's stated preference for deinstitutionalization. 47 A later
class action challenging conditions in a Minnesota institution, Welsch v.
Likins,48 provided additional support for the deinstitutionalization con-
cept. The Welsch court relied on decisions that had recognized that men-
tally ill persons " 'cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less
drastic means' for achieving the same basic goals of protecting and treating
them." 49
B. Statutory Right to Habilitation in the Least Restrictive Environment
Judicial interpretations of statutory provisions also have affected the
right of mentally retarded persons to habilitation in the least restrictive
environment. In Dixon v. Weinberger5" patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital
in Washington, D.C. brought a class action suit asserting a right under
41. The district court in Pennhurst stressed that the noninstitutionalized mentally re-
tarded have no constitutional right to habilitation, because the legal basis for the right is
derived from the restriction of liberty that institutionalization imposes. 446 F. Supp. at
1318.
42. See Ewing, Health Planning and Deinstitutionalization: Adocacy Within the Admin-
istrative Process, 31 STAN. L. REv. 679, 680-83 (1979).
43. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
44. Id
45. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
47. The district court had included in its habilitation standards a requirement that pre-
Flacement evaluation must have determined that the institution actually would provide the
least restrictive habilitative setting. The order indicated that the court viewed community
settings as better able to facilitate habilitation and normalization. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
48. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aJ/d inpart and vacated and remanded inpart, 550
F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
49. 373 F. Supp. at 502 (quoting Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis.
1972)). See generally Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Eubanks v. Clarke,
434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The district court in Pennhurst adopted a more radical
anti-institutionalization stance. Finding that an institution is inherently restrictive, the
Pennhurst court indicated that an institution can never serve as the least restrictive habilita-
tive environment and that, as a result, all institutional placements violate constitutional
rights. 446 F. Supp. at 1325; see note 12 supra and accompanying text.
50. 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); see Friedman, Rights of the Mentally Handicapped-




both the Constitution and the relevant District of Columbia law5 to place-
ment in a facility less restrictive than an institution. The federal district
court refused to address the constitutional questions but ruled that a right
to placement in a less restrictive facility existed under Washington, D.C.'s
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act of 1964.52 The court further held
that the appropriate District of Columbia and federal officials had an af-
firmative obligation to create suitable facilities if such institutions did not
already exist.53
Significantly, the court in Dixon accepted statutory arguments with re-
gard to the least restrictive environment that were analogous to constitu-
tional arguments for habilitation.54 Success in gaining recognition of
statutory rights, and the limitations and uncertainties of the constitution-
ally based decisions, 55 have inspired advocates of the mentally disabled to
direct their attention to federal statutes.56 The possibility that congres-
sional enactments of mental health laws represent codifications of constitu-
tional rights 57 suggests that the statutes themselves may further the
enforcement of these rights.58
The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of
197559 is designed to provide federal grant aid "to assist States to assure
that persons with developmental disabilities receive the care, treatment,
and other services necessary to enable them to achieve their maximum po-
tential through a system. . . which ensures the protection of the legal and
51. Hospitalization of the Mentally IIl Act of 1964, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 21-501 to
-591 (West 1967 & Supp. 1978-1979). A right to treatment under the same statute had al-
ready been recognized. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
52. 405 F. Supp. at 974.
53. Id at 978-79.
54. Id. at 976-77; see Decisions, Court Orders Creation ofLess Restrictive Facilities, 1
MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 12, 13 (1976). For a discussion of the constitutional justifica-
tion for the least restrictive placement principle, see notes 42-49 supra and accompanying
text.
55. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
56. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see notes 59-64 infra and accompanying text. The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976), guar-
antees every handicapped child an appropriate education and the protection of relevant due
process administrative procedures. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), provides vocational services for the handicapped. Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federally funded programs from discriminating
against handicapped persons. Id. § 794.
57. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (codification of the right to equal protection in § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973).
58. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 42; Rosenberg & Friedman, Developmental Disability
Law.- A Look into the Future, 31 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1979); Note, Public Law 94-103." An
Implied Private Right ofAction to Enforce the Right to Treatmentfor Institutionalized Men-
tallyRetarded Persons, 54 IND. L.J. 505 (1979).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The DD Act is an amendment to
the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 91-517,
84 Stat. 1316 (1969), enacted to alleviate conditions in overcrowded and obsolete institutions
by funding the creation of facilities and services. ABA Amicus Brief in the Case of
Pennhurst v. Halderman, reprinted i part in 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 54-55 (1981).
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human rights of persons with developmental disabilities. ' 60 State partici-
pation in the grant program is voluntary. Those states that accept aid
under the DD Act agree to comply with certain conditions that also may
represent benefits for the developmentally disabled.6' The DD Act in-
cludes a bill of rights provision that sets out congressional findings as to
the rights of the developmentally disabled.6 2 Additional sections contain
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). The mentally retarded are by definition
considered developmentally disabled for the purposes of the DD Act. Id. § 6001(b)(7). The
DD Act, however, does not include an institutionalization requirement. Thus, a recognition
of a right to habilitation under the DD Act would differ from a comparable constitutional
right in that the statutory right would be extended to the noninstitutionalized mentally re-
tarded. See 19 DUQ. L. REV. 149, 158 (1980).
61. Section 6005 requires that participating states affirmatively act to hire the handi-
capped. 42 U.S.C. § 6005 (1976). Section 6009 conditions the receipt of funds on the sub-
mission of a state plan for monitoring service delivery. Id § 6009 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Section 6011 provides for the development of an individual habilitation plan for each person
receiving services under a program funded by the DD Act. Id § 6011. Section 6012 man-
dates the establishment of advocacy systems on behalf of developmentally disabled persons.
Id § 6012.
Section 6012 has facilitated significant growth in a nationwide advocacy system for the
developmentally disabled. For a discussion of the implementation of these advocacy pro-
grams, see Weisberg, Statewide Advocacy Systemsfor the Developmentally Disabled-Profiles
in Innovation: Study Executive Summary, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 53 (1979).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976) states:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with
developmental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate
treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with develop-
mental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental poten-
tial of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive
of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to
assure that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residen-
tial program for persons with developmental disabilities that-
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appro-
priate to the needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards:
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the persons
with developmental disabilities being served by the program.
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient medical and
dental services.
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on such persons unless
absolutely necessary and prohibition of the use of such restraint as a punish-
ment or as a substitute for a habilitation program.
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints on such per-
sons and the use of such restraints as punishment or as a substitute for a
habilitation program or in quantities that interfere with services, treatment,
or habilitation for such persons.
(v) Permission for close relatives of such persons to visit them at reason-
able hours without prior notice.
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as may be
promulgated by the Secretary.
A 1978 amendment provides: "[T]he rights of persons with developmental disabilities de-
scribed in findings made in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights
otherwise afforded to all persons." Id (Supp. III 1979). The meaning and effect of § 6010
are the subject of the Supreme Court's review in Pennhurst.
NOTES
funding63 and enforcement 64 provisions.
Judicial interpretation of the DD Act is limited.65 In United States v.
Soloman66 the Attorney General of the United States sought to enjoin
Maryland health officials from allegedly violating the constitutional rights
of institutionalized mentally retarded persons. The federal district court
held that the DD Act did not provide the Attorney General with the statu-
tory authority to sue to enforce the rights of the mentally retarded.67 Fur-
thermore, in a dictum, the court viewed the DD Act as representing
nothing more than a congressional "carrot-and-stick" technique to en-
courage the states to provide the developmentally disabled with improved
habilitative care. 68
In Naughton v. Bevilacqua69 Timothy Naughton, a voluntarily institu-
tionalized mentally retarded youth, brought suit against Rhode Island
mental health officials for permanent injunctive relief and damages.
Naughton alleged that either his constitutional or federal statutory rights
had been violated when the improper administration of a tranquilizer
caused him to suffer an allergic reaction and injuries. The court accepted
the plaintiff's argument that the drug had been administered for custodial
purposes as a means of restraint rather than for habilitative or therapeutic
purposes.70 Explaining that the legislative history of the DD Act sup-
ported the recognition of a statutory "right to appropriate treatment" and
"habilitation" for the mentally retarded, 7' the Naughton court held that
the DD Act can be enforced through a private cause of action.72 The is-
sues on appeal, however, centered on the potential liability of the institu-
tion's director rather than on the recognition of rights under the DD Act.73
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6060-6063 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Participating states must submit a
satisfactory plan outlining proposed funding utilization plans. A plan must provide "assur-
ances" that the state will protect the rights of the developmentally disabled pursuant to
§ 6010. Id § 6063(b)(5)(C).
64. Id § 6065. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has the authority to termi-
nate or reduce aid to a noncomplying state.
65. Some of the relevant literature anticipated that § 6010 of the DD Act created a
substantive right to appropriate treatment and habilitation in the least restrictive environ-
ment. See Ewing, supra note 42, at 707-08; Note, Implied ExecutiveAuthority to Bring Suit to
Enforce the Rights of Institutionalized Citizens, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 794, 810 (1977).
66. 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), a]1'd, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
67. 419 F. Supp. at 370. The decision has not been without criticism. See Schoenfeld,
supra note 36, at 626; Note, supra note 65, at 810-11.
68. 419 F. Supp. at 370.
69. 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), aft'd, 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979).
70. 458 F. Supp. at 614.
71. Id at 614-15 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1) (1976)).
72. 458 F. Supp. at 615. Finding that the § 6010 statutory right was also a civil right,
the court ruled that a private cause of action is available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
III 1979). 458 F. Supp. at 616. Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who. . . subjects
.. .any citizen of the United States. . .to the deprivation of any rights. . . secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." The Naughton court also ruled
that the DD Act meets the Cori v. Ash requirements for an implied cause of action. Id; see
note 16 supra and accompanying text.
73. Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 605 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1979). The First Circuit ruled
that the institution's director could not be held individually liable for injuries sustained by
Naughton. Id. at 589-90.
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Accordingly, the First Circuit refused to decide whether the DD Act cre-
ated any substantive rights in favor of the developmentally disabled. 74
II. PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL V. HALDERMAN
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman the Supreme Court
ruled that the DD Act does not provide the mentally retarded a statutory
right to appropriate habilitation in the least restrictive environment.75
Limiting its decision to review and interpretation of the DD Act, the Court
avoided ruling on constitutional issues, questions presented under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Pennsylvania state law claims. 76
The Court remanded these issues to the Third Circuit for consideration. 77
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by characterizing the
DD Act as a federal funding program designed to benefit the developmen-
tally disabled. 78 The majority reviewed the legislative authority for the
DD Act to determine whether Congress intended to create enforceable
rights under section 6010.79 Traditionally, the Court has been reluctant to
infer that Congress has exercised its power to act pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment.80 The Court could find scant support for such
an inference in Pennhurst because the alleged rights, if mandatory, would
impose affirmative financial obligations on the states, thus upsetting the
federal-state balance of power.8' As a result the Court reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend to impose an absolute obligation on the states to pro-
vide appropriate habilitation for the mentally retarded.8 2
The Court found that Congress enacted the DD Act pursuant to the
spending power set out in the Constitution; 3 thus, the legislation proposes
a contract whereby the states can voluntarily agree to comply with certain
conditions in exchange for federal aid.8 4 If Congress intends to impose
conditions, the Court reasoned, it must do so unambiguously, so that the
74. Id. at 588 n.3.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 1536, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
76. Id. at 1546-47, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 716.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1536, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see note 62 supra and accompanying text.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. The Court has endorsed legislative
exercise of § 5 power when Congress has expressed its intent to invoke that power. 101 S.
Ct. at 1539, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 706 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1975); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
81. 101 S. Ct. at 1539, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 707.
82. Id. Legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 assigns an absolute duty to the states to
conform to congressional policy. Id., 67 L. Ed. 2d at 706. Therefore, if the Court in Pen-
nhurst had found that § 5 provided the power to legislate the DD Act, then the states would
have been required to provide habilitation to the mentally retarded regardless of the cost.
Id. at 1540, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 708.
83. Id. at 1540, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 708. "The Congress shall have Power To. . . provide
for the. . . general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See gener-
ally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
84. 101 S. Ct. at 1539, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 707.
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states can knowingly and voluntarily agree to comply with the condi-
tions.85 The respondent class relied on section 6010 of the DD Act as a
reservoir of guaranteed substantive rights for the mentally retarded. 86
Comparing section 6010 with other provisions of the DD Act that ex-
pressly impose conditions on the receipt of funding, the Court found the
section did not meet the clear notice requirement and could not serve as a
funding condition.87 Furthermore, the Court expressed concern that a
contrary finding would impose excessive financial obligations on the
states.88 As a result the Court in Pennhurst held that section 6010 repre-
sents a general federal policy of preference for community alternatives to
institutionalization8 9 and thus merely encourages, rather than mandates,
better care for the handicapped. 90
The Court discussed, without ruling on, three additional issues.91 Al-
though not precluding private citizens from enforcing other recognized
conditional obligations existing under the DD Act,92 the Court cautioned
that a private cause of action is not guaranteed.93 In addition, the Court
85. Id at 1539-40, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 707.
86. See Brief for the Respondents at 34-49, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981).
87. 101 S. Ct. at 1543, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 712. The Court's interpretation of the statute
determined that: § 6010 is termed a "finding," while §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, 6012, 6063, and
6067 are termed "conditions"; if Congress had intended "appropriate treatment" as a re-
quirement under the DD Act, more adequate funding would have been provided; "appro-
priate treatment" is too vague a term to represent an enforceable obligation. Id, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 711-12. Of particular interest is the Court's treatment of the reference in
§ 6063(b)(5)(C) to § 6010. See note 63 supra. Rather than finding the reference to be sup-
portive of § 6010's potential substantive significance, the Court stated that the reference
would have been unnecessary if the states were required to fund § 6010 rights. Id at 1544,
67 L. Ed. 2d at 712-13.
88. The Court, however, did not discuss any data relevant to that expense. Community
facilities for the mentally retarded are less expensive to operate than institutions. See Hald-
erman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Mental
retardation professionals estimate that 75% of the mentally retarded are capable of becom-
ing self-sufficient, while another 10%-15% are capable of partial self-sufficiency. Murdock,
supra note 22, at 163 n. 116. Although the initial outlay of establishing facilities and training
programs may be high, in the long run, the cost of providing services will be much lower
because the need for expensive custodial care would be significantly reduced. See id. at 161-
65. But see 19 DUQ. L. REV. 149, 164 (1980). If habilitation rights are recognized under the
DD Act, the financial impact from the states becoming obligated to provide care and serv-
ices to all mentally retarded citizens, not just the institutionalized, would be extensive. Id
89. 101 S. Ct. at 1540, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 708.
90. Id at 1544-45, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 713. The Court emphasized a comparison between
Pennhurst and Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Id. In
Southeastern the Court ruled that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1976 & Supp. III 1979) does not require the states to take affirmative action to help a handi-
capped individual overcome the school and work related problems inherent in the individ-
ual's disability. The states are only "encouraged" to take such action. 442 U.S. at 410. The
Court also stressed that the DD Act's legislative history supported the holding. 101 S. Ct. at
1541, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 709.
91. The Court remanded the issues to the Third Circuit for consideration. 101 S. Ct. at
1546, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 715.
92. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
93. The Court's discussion dealt with private enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. I 1979). See note 72 and accompanying text. See also Medley v. Ginsburg, 492 F.
Supp. 1294 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (§ 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce DD Act rights).
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stated that the imposition of penalties for noncompliance with the DD Act
may require more than a showing that the state is a participant in the legis-
lative program.94 The Court suggested that a state will be subject to the
DD Act's conditions only when the particular institution under review has
benefitted directly from receipt of DD Act funds.95 Finally, the Court's
discussion of possible remedies for state noncompliance under the DD Act
evidenced a preference for enjoining funding rather than mandating cor-
rective measures that would require financial expenditures by the states.96
While concurring with the majority, Justice Blackmun expressed con-
cern about inferences that the Court made as to future enforcement limita-
tions.97 He therefore advocated both the recognition of a private cause of
action and the acknowledgement that state receipt of funds would bring all
of a state's institutions under the provisions of the DD Act. 98
Justice White authored a dissenting opinion on behalf of Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall. While agreeing with the majority that Congress en-
acted the DD Act pursuant to the constitutional spending power,99 the
dissent's interpretation of the legislative history of section 6010 and the
relative position of the section within the DD Act led to the conclusion
that section 6010 operates to create a conditional right to appropriate treat-
ment and habilitation in the least restrictive environment.I °° Accordingly,
the dissent addressed significant issues flowing from the recognition of sec-
tion 6010 rights. Justice White concluded that state receipt of funds re-
quires adherence to section 6010 obligations even in institutions not
directly receiving funds,' 0 that the developmentally disabled can enforce
these rights in a private cause of action, 10 2 and that noncompliance should
be remedied by allowing the state to choose between compliance or cessa-
tion of funding. 0 3
III. CONCLUSION
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman the Supreme Court
ruled that the mentally retarded do not have a substantive right to habilita-
tion in the least restrictive environment under section 6010 of the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975. The decision
hinders efforts to secure appropriate habilitation and to establish alterna-
In comparison the Third Circuit held that an implied private cause of action existed under
the DD Act pursuant to the Cort Y. Ash requirements. See note 16 supra and accompanying
text.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1545, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 714.
95. Id.
96. Id at 1545-46, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 714-15.
97. Id. at 1547, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 717.
98. Id at 1547-48, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 716-17.
99. Id at 1549, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 718.
100. Id, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 719. The dissent particularly criticized the majority's treatment
of § 6063(b)(5)(C) and its reference to § 6010. Id at 1551-52, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 722; see note
87 supra and accompanying text.
101. 101 S. Ct. at 1552, 67 L. Ed. at 722.
102. Id at 1558, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 729.
103. Id, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 730.
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tives to institutional care for the mentally retarded while reinforcing the
prevailing role of the states as the provider of public services. Arguably,
the Court's concern for states' rights and potential expense took prece-
dence in Pennhurst over any concern the Court might have had for the
impact of the decision on developmentally disabled persons. Advocates
for the mentally retarded should take note that the decision is limited in its
direct effect, because the Court rejected only the claim of entitlement
under section 6010 of the DD Act. The existing constitutional precedents,
which have addressed the right to habilitation and the less restrictive com-
munity facilities issues, have been left intact for the time being. Further-
more, while not providing encouragement, the decision does not preclude
individuals from suing to enforce recognized requirements under the DD
Act or from suing under other federal or state mental health laws. The
Court's focus on the states' position, however, should serve as a reminder
that arguments for aid to the mentally retarded may not be received by a
Court not inclined to expand their legal rights.
Deborah Godich Hardwick

